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Abstract
European Union enlargement and accession are reflexive of both EU and post-com-
munist social policies. There is a unique “dialogue“ going on, indicative of fundamen-
tal aspects of post-communist, post-transitional social policy. It is also a 'mirror' that
reflects shortcomings of governance, and often presents a neglected institutional land-
scape. Therefore, the Europeanisation of social policy is an essential transformation
process for post-communist countries whereby a new language and new concepts are
introduced, the outlines of new social-policy governance emerge and enter the space in
which social policy is formulated and considered. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union lands on very peculiar space when it arrives in Central and
Eastern Europe. It lands on a particular political, social and economic space, with a
unique institutional landscape, with a special culture of governance and numerous
socialist legacies. The aim of this article is to address EU accession as a unique process,
which provides an excellent mirror for post-communist social policy. But what does this
mirror show us? The need for a complex linguistic, conceptual mapping, which recon-
figures the way we formulate and think of social policy. Not least, because European
accession is a meeting point of national and supranational social policies, and the dia-
logue of these two systems. It is a dialogue of two different constructions, two different
policymaking structures, two different historical legacies, social policy vocabularies,
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Accepted: January 4, 2005with different understandings and meanings. It is a meaning-making process coupled
with new politics: new boundaries and new borders, new inclusions and exclusion
processes are generated, of which we know far too little.
2. Social policy versus competitiveness 
In Central and Eastern Europe the discourse of ‘social policy versus competitive-
ness’ is a new agenda, an agenda of the transformational politics. Social policy in
Central and Eastern Europe has been formed by the economic discourse of market-mak-
ing versus market-correcting policies. According to Zsuzsa Ferge, Central and Eastern
Europe became an experimental field of the global market (Ferge, 2000). These coun-
tries, if her argument is accepted, were particularly exposed to neo-liberal economic and
implicit societal policies. Deacon (1998; 2000) argues, however, that it was not eco-
nomic, but instead, political globalisation that impacted heavily on social policy devel-
opment in stern Europe, meaning global actors, such as the World Bank, promoting a
particular social policy, driven by ideological reasons and views on how social policy
should position itself in relation to the market. Similar to European level social policy,
post-communist social policy was dominated by market-making features and seriously
lacked market-correcting visions on social policy. Price liberalisation was not followed
by targeted support for those most hit by the drastic increase in the prices of fundamen-
tal goods; the increase of interest rates on mortgages did not continue to offer compen-
sation for those taking on highly subsidized home loans before 1989, resulting in tens of
thousands of families being threatened by homelessness. Marketisation of the pension
and partially the health care system, the cut back in social security payments and bene-
fits all served both to remove the burdens from the market in the form of cut-back pub-
lic expenditures and to invite private investments into social services and infrastructures.
Similarly to the development of social policy at the EU level, social policy formulated
in Central and Eastern Europe in the 90s has been closely linked to negative freedom,
and in EU context, negative integration. The same struggle seems to appear between lib-
eral and social rights. The ‘down the ladder’ themes are taking place in post-communist
countries as well. Social rights, despite having been constitutionalised, have been call
into question and withdrawn. 
3. Institutional capacities: institutional deserts and fragmented
institutional structures
Little attention has been given by the transition literature of social policy to the
weak institutional capacities to formulate, to enforce, and to implement policies. Central
and Eastern European states are relatively ‘weak states’: they have a limited capacity to
collect taxes, to tackle the black or grey economy (a financially weak state), they are
caught in a legislation trap: the Parliaments of these countries are swamped by massive
legislative work, which puts a heavy burden on the whole horizon of the policy-making
machinery (a weak regulatory state). As a result there are insufficient capacities to fol-
low up, to evaluate, and to monitor the implementation of even major legislation.
2
N. Lendvai: Central Eastern European Social Policy and European Union Accession - Time For Reflections
Financial Theory and Practice, 29 (1), 1-12 (2005)Decentralisation further highlighted institutional weaknesses. All in all, “the most basic
fact of all in assessing the reformulation of social policy in Central and Eastern Europe
is that all institutions are weak, and as such the scope for negotiating binding agreements
between contending interest groups is limited and fragile” (Standing, 1996:249).
Since social policy is closely linked both to the state-making (as a necessary author-
ity to correct market failures and promoting public good) and market-making mecha-
nisms (by negative integration, or negative social policy that is a social policy aimed at
removing the boundaries of market competitiveness), the question of trade-offs between
competitiveness and positive, interventionist social policy occupies the dynamics of
both European integration and the transition process. Although the issues raised by the
two processes are the same, they are occurring in very different circumstances. There
has been no past of equity-efficiency choices in the framework of the market economy.
In case of Hungary, the trade-off oriented arguments focus on what is called the ‘pre-
mature welfare state’ a concept by Kornai (1993). It is argued that compared to the level
of economic development and the national GDP, as far as the fiscal capacity of the
Hungarian welfare state is concerned, it is over-muscled. The level of welfare spending
is not supported by economic performance, therefore it pre-empts the fiscal policy space
and hinders investments and economic restructuring. Throughout the transition the eco-
nomic and, it is probably fair to say, the political discourse were occupied by the trade-
off argument: social policy being a highly unproductive sector, the generous entitle-
ments discourage market behaviour in households and reinforce paternalistic expecta-
tions. The conclusions drawn by economists and the actions taken by politicians were
rather simplistic: instead of state-building, state-dismantling took place (Grzymala and
Luong, 2002). Ever since then, the aspect of social policy as cushioning the social con-
sequences of the transformational recession has been highly neglected. The discourse of
social policy being a positive factor in economic growth and competitiveness through
the improvement of human resources and the reduction of inequalities is not present,
despite the fact that the welfare regimes in the ECE countries have played an important
role in cushioning the blows of marketisation and privatisation, not to speak of the worst
economic recession of the twentieth century (Kovács, 2002:199). The trade-off remains,
throwing social policy onto the margins of general high-politics. 
Kornai’s concept highlights another point. The necessary reform of the premature
welfare state is a key issue in the Hungarian and post-communist transition and consol-
idation. In his argument, a minimalist safety net, that is a residual social policy, is the
antithesis of socialist paternalism (Gedeon, 1996). However, in non-ideological, and
more technical terms the thesis is universalism and not paternalism. Universalism was
rejected for all the wrong reasons. Economists urged a cheap welfare state while uni-
versalism was associated with socialist paternalism because it was regarded as wasteful
and expensive. However, as Esping-Andersen argues, narrow targeting is inefficient for
three reasons: first it is administratively costly (and moreover requires a ‘strong state’ in
an institutional sense, which post-communist countries are not, for they have weak
administrative capacities); second because it often fails its objective, that is to secure
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because it nurtures poverty traps (Esping-Andersen, 1996).
A fundamental societal feature of the transition in Central and Eastern Europe was
what could be described as the termination of the existing social contract and the battle
over what the new social contract should be about. The contour of the new contract was
defined in rather negative terms: the withdrawal of state provisions and responsibility
and the attack on the citizens’ attitudes towards social provisions, the so-called homo
sovieticus (according to the opinion by Janet and John about the cultural governance).
The more explicit public debate over the social contract comes about at the time, main-
ly in the second half of the 90s when the politics of the transition is not about the distri-
bution of the losses, but when economic recovery allows for distribution and redistrib-
ution of the gains. All in all, rhetoric – probably in the case of EU as well – seems to be
a tool substituting for the social contract, or functioning as a ‘quasi-contract’. 
Both societal goals and social policy as instrument to pursue societal goals are in
trouble. Concerning societal goals, values and norms, Ferge  (2001; 125) notes that “the
respect for basic “western” values like social integration, solidarity or distributive jus-
tice is absent from home public policy. Not even lip service is paid to them. This makes
it difficult to put them on the agenda of public discourse”. Societal values listed above
have been de-legitimised, and not been reformulated. Policy formulation has not been
driven by negotiated social or societal principles, but instead took place in a pragmatic,
often rushed and ad-hoc manner. The lack of public discourse on fundamental societal
principles leads to the instrumentalisation of social policy. In the Hungarian example, it
could be argued that in the first waves of reforms, the conservative government (1990-
1994) instrumentalised social policy for the sake of political legitimation. That meant a
status-quo-oriented approach with delayed reforms. The second, socialist-liberal coali-
tion government (1994-98) instrumentalised social policy for the needs of economic
policy and launched a strong neo-liberal ideological attack – in the form of a forceful
moral agenda - on the welfare state and paternalism. The shock therapy in 1995 involved
the most radical cutbacks, which was partly reversed by the Constitutional Court. The
third, conservative government (1998-2002) was the first to distribute more wins than
losses. However, social policy was mainly used by political motivation: to build up a
middle-class that would then become the stable base for a united conservative party. 
4. European Union accession: remaking governance? 
From the point of view of the candidate countries, the problem of the acquis is a
problem of governance. Working with Standing’s (1996) definition of governance as an
institutional framework for formulating, implementing, administering, monitoring and
evaluating social policy schemes, what we see in Central and Eastern Europe is an insti-
tutional desert (Bruszt, 2001); policy-making vacuum (Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs,
1997); and institutional incoherence (Henderson and Hulme, 2002) where all the actors
are weak (Standing, 1996). CEE states are relatively ‘weak states’: they have a limited
capacity to collect taxes, to tackle the black or grey economy, they are caught in a leg-
islation trap: the parliaments of these countries are involved in massive work on legis-
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ery, creating a weak regulatory state. As a result there are insufficient capacities to fol-
low up, evaluate, and monitor the implementation of even major legislation. As argued
by Standing on tripartite governance, but which could equally be applied to fields such
as the pension or health reforms during the transformation process: ‘all institutions are
weak, and as such the scope for binding agreements between the contending interest
groups is limited and fragile’ (Standing, 1996:249). Wagener (2002:172), reviewing the
welfare states in transition, comes to similar conclusions. The weak institutional capac-
ities and weak social policy governance have a number of implications: they highlight
performance gaps as well as set the framework and the institutional capacities of social
actors to participate in the accession process. The performance gap, a fundamental yet
neglected feature of post-communist social policy, refers to a general discrepancy
between legislation and implementation (European Parliament, 1998; Avdagic, 2001;
Vaughan-Whitehead, 2003; Sotiropoulos, Neamtu and Stoyanova, 2003) with the impli-
cation that looking at laws alone therefore gives us few guidelines to actual practice. 
Beside institutional concerns, another set of issues related to the economic costs,
financial assistance and redistribution aspects is crucial to understanding the accession
and enlargement processes. The heading of this section refers to an issue-cleavage
between competitiveness versus social considerations and their conflicting discourses.
The revisited nature of the ‘economic’ versus the ‘social’ is twofold. On the one hand,
it is revisited at the European level: among many others, Kleinman (2002) argues that
there seems to be a ‘genuine ambiguity’ in the EU documents between the social agen-
da of high social standards and quality of life, and on the other hand economic compet-
itiveness and the deregulatory economic agenda. Even before enlargement became an
issue, the EU spoke two languages: the language of competitiveness and the language
of social Europe. CEE countries and post-transitional social policies are also fairly
familiar with similar welfare debates. In the post-communist context this meant a cleav-
age between the ‘premature welfare state’ and the promotion of competitiveness versus
arguments for the importance of the social commitments by the governments to meet
social needs that resulted from the adverse economic consequences of the regime
change. Enlargement has done little to reconcile the social and economic agendas.
The unresolved and conflictual messages that accession has produced, coupled with
the dominance of economic considerations and the neglect of social issues, will very
likely increase social inequalities in the candidate countries, but also produce ‘double
losers’ (Inotai, 2000): social groups who suffered from the economic consequences of
the regime change due to age, qualifications, or ethnicity, and will increase their disad-
vantages during the accession. CEE accession countries, however, are likely to face two
fundamental challenges posed by transformation, European integration and globaliza-
tion. First, accession countries are likely to suffer greatly from the anticipated erosion of
the sovereignty and autonomy of their states. Second, the lack of both ‘consensual social
partnership’ and cultural and social infrastructure of ‘neo-corporatist interest intermedi-
ation’, consensus building and the ‘institutional desert’ (Bruszt, 2001) makes CEE coun-
tries even more vulnerable to globalization and EU integration. Taking into account the
argument made by institutionalist economists and sociologists, CEE countries have rel-
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predictable policy environment; (b) prevent the use of state institutions by powerful pri-
vate (and international) groups to redistribute wealth and opportunities; and (c) regulate
relations between economic and social actors in a balanced way (Bruszt, 2000). 
5. European Union as neology and time travel: linguistic and conceptual
mapping in the remaking of social policy
Krémer (2004) describes EU social policy as a neology and as a neutralised lan-
guage umbrella, developed by ‘Eurocrats’ in order to be able to reach a wide consensus
among diverse stakeholders. Indeed, the neological ‘face’ of the EU social policy is a
very relevant feature of the formation of a supranational social policy from the stand-
point of the new Member States, because terms such as social exclusion, social inclu-
sion, gender mainstreaming, social cohesion and policy coordination are highly novel to
these countries. The consensual understanding of these terms is the result of decades of
political, economic and welfare state development (Szalai, 2002) which the newcomers
have not been part of. However, as Szalai argues, it is not only a matter of ‘phase and
time delay’ (Krémer, 2003), and the nature of the catch-up is not only legal harmonisa-
tion and the adoption of the new language in itself - in the post-communist context, even
before a developed welfare state can emerge, the necessary reform of it is coming on the
agenda (Szalai, 2002). For these countries the discourse on social exclusion is arriving
on the agenda before a poverty discourse has had time to evolve; the workfare agenda
comes in before they develop a strong sense of social citizenship; they face third-way
issues before exploring in any meaningful sense the first two; governance is being talked
about when these countries think in terms of Governments. One of the biggest chal-
lenges for Central and Eastern European countries is how to cope with such ‘indi-
gestible’ terms and ideas and whether they can productively go through a ‘time travel’. 
Concepts and ideas such as social inclusion, cohesion, mainstreaming, joint gover-
nance, partnership, social dialogue are all terms that are culturally and historically
embedded in decades of western European welfare state development. Some of these
terms such as gender inequalities, social partnership and joint governance, or even social
exclusion and poverty have been silenced as policy issues due to political reasons, even
long after 1989. Silences manifest themselves in languages. Many countries for exam-
ple do not have their own indigenous term for social inclusion. In Hungary, the National
Action Plan for social inclusion (NAP/incl) 2004-2006 translated itself as National
Action Plan for ‘Togetherness’, partly because inclusion does not have a consensual
translation, and partly because the term (inclusion) used by the Joint Inclusion
Memorandum (JIM), which precedes NAP, was claimed to indicate a hierarchical rela-
tion between those who include and the included. The term social exclusion has also
generated debates over whether social exclusion implies an active exclusion by some-
body (like the state), or people just happen to be excluded. In Hungary, during the prepa-
ration of the JIM, there has been some political resistance to use of the active form of
the verb exclusion, because they argued that ‘nobody excludes anybody in Hungary’.
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policy governance
European Union accession, with its main instruments such as the open-method of
co-ordination (OMC) and the Structural Funds challenge at least 5 key elements of post-
communist social policy governance. These are: rigid budget structure, ‘messy con-
tracts’, broken policy cycles, weak social dialogue, and weak or absent statistical data. 
Structural problems of the budget are strong communist legacies. The central bud-
get is ‘sectorally’ based and distributed among Ministries. The system discourages inter-
ministerial cooperation and coordination. Some important issues fall out of the budget-
ing and the focus of ministries because they would need cross-sectoral cooperation (i.e.
tax credits incentivising employment, school social work, voluntary work, corporate
social responsibility, community work, social housing, or adult education issues). Public
spending is not confronted with efficiency or efficacy criteria for they are not monitored
or evaluated. 
“Messy contracts” can be directly linked to budgeting and to the financial tech-
niques used in post-communist Europe. I refer to messy contract to describe the type of
social care and social assistance governance where there is an implicit logic between
central government (funder) and service providers and managers of social assistance
(mostly local self-governments). The ‘messiness’ of the contract is that there is a short-
age of available funds to run social assistance and basic social care, therefore the capi-
tation grants are insufficient, as exchange services are not provided, despite the legal
obligation. Services are not provided, the assistance capitation grant is often used for
other non-social purposes, but the central government does not enforce the implemen-
tation of laws, nor does it set quality standards or monitor service provisions. Regional
inequalities and lack of access to basic social services have only recently been docu-
mented mainly in the JIMs. 
Broken policy cycles are also a fundamental feature of social policy-making in
Central and Eastern Europe, meaning that key elements of policy-making were missing.
Until the very end of the 1990s in most countries the ministry responsible for social pol-
icy did not have a strategic unit. Agenda-setting and policy formation processes are ran-
dom and ad-hoc. Implementation is often missing; evaluation and monitoring are very
rarely applied. Non-governmental actors find a point at which to intervene and to par-
ticipate with difficulty, not least because partnership and dialogue paths are not always
institutionalised either. This leads to fragmented decision-making structures, but also to
dual realities of formal and informal arrangements, practice and policies. 
Weak or absent statistical data are also not only a technical matter. Missing data
often means lack of action. Data imply a need for action, because “we do not measure
things except when we want to change them or change our behaviour in response to
them” (Stone, 2002:167). Statistical data are reflexive of knowledge. CEE countries
however, have little or no data on the main social target groups such as the Romany,
people living with disabilities, or the homeless. The EU’s efforts to produce common
indicators have an important role in calling for improving social statistics, to facilitate
knowledge production to bring previous policy silences into voice. 
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are trying to maximise their own available funds, therefore there is a disincentive to
share funds and responsibility. Issues are divided in a clear-cut way. No surprise then
that the JIMs call for introducing cooperation between welfare and employment ser-
vices, between social workers and health professionals, education and social services,
social and regional development. Sectoralism is also apparent in the Structural Funds
measures, and it is hugely difficult to design an intersectoral measure. In Hungary for
example the Human Resource Development Operational Programme does not contain a
single measure that is cross-sectoral. This also results in duplication of services, since,
for example, employment services instead of cooperating with local social services, cre-
ate their own ‘psycho-social’ counselling services. The massive institutionalisation that
took place in the last 5 years in these countries in the field of equal opportunities, social
exclusion, regional development, e-inclusion and employability could well – without
enhanced cooperation and the strengthening the governance capacities for coordination
- result in overcomplicated nexus of services incomprehensible to citizens and wasteful
in terms of public funds. 
The transition in Central and Eastern Europe can be characterized as a state for-
mation, which is ‘rapid, taking place over decades rather than centuries, and as yet has
not reached a stable outcome’, which, moreover, is ‘influenced by unique international
pressures’ (Grzymala and Luong, 2002:531). These factors (i.e. the weakness of state-
hood, and the volatile nature of states in the hyper-rapid process of state building) may
support the argument that accession countries are going to be less likely to resist the loss
of sovereignty and autonomy of national social policy than were current member states.
One couldn’t agree more with Ferrera and Boeri (2001:88), who argue that what EU
social policy needs is the exchange of ideas and encouragement of coordination among
the social policies of the member states, while the ‘EU should insist more on monitor-
ing, assessment and benchmarking thereby stimulating better management of public
resources in various countries’; and the gradual introduction of a pan-European safety
net preventing forms of extreme poverty.
7. Conclusion
Social policy is not a national business any more. New actors, new stakeholders, and
new voices are heard. New actors bring new meanings and new discourses whereby some
actors are empowered while others get marginalized. However, Europeanization and the
transformation of post-communist social policy governance is not an unproblematic
process. Let’s make it clear, it is not just learning, and deliberation, it is also politicking,
new issue cleavages and in same cases silencing take place. But in order to explore those
implicit processes much more research and recognition are needed to realise that acces-
sion puts a mirror both in front of EU and post-communist social policy.
Central and Eastern European countries need a stronger European vision on social
policy, both by hardening the core social-policy competences at EU level, and by soft-
ening and extending soft social policy, promoting policy learning and improving social
policy governance. 
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